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Introduction
This document provides a preliminary assessment of the 
South Korean health system relative to the goal of universal 
health coverage, with a particular focus on the financing 
system and related aspects of provision.
In the 2010 World Health Report, universal health 
coverage is defined as providing everyone in a country 
with financial protection from the costs of using health 
care and ensuring access to the health services they need 
(World Health Organisation 2010). These services should 
be of sufficient quality to be effective. 
This document presents data that provide insights into the 
extent of financial protection and access to needed health 
services in South Korea.
2 The data quoted in this section all derive from the 2012 data in the World Health Organisation’s Global Health Expenditure Database (http://apps.who.int/nha/database/
Home/Index/en). Comparisons with other countries are based on figures expressed in terms of purchasing power parity. The country’s income category is determined from 
the World Bank’s classification for the same year (http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups).
3 Different countries use the terms ‘national health insurance,’ ‘social health insurance’ and ‘social security’ differently to describe different types of mandatory health 
insurance. In each country assessment in this series, the term applied is the one commonly in use in the country in question. In South Korea, the term ’national health 
insurance’ is used for the mandatory health insurance scheme once it achieved universal health coverage in 1989.
Table 1: National Health Accounts indicators of health care expenditure and sources of finance in 
South Korea (2012)
Indicators of the level of health care expenditure
1.   Total expenditure on health as % of GDP 7.5%
2.   General government expenditure on health as % of GDP 4.1%
3.   General government expenditure on health as % of total government expenditure 13.6%
4a. Per capita government expenditure on health at average exchange rate (US$) 926.7
4b. Per capita government expenditure on health (PPP $) 1,263.5
Indicators of the source of funds for health care
5.   General government expenditure on health as % of total expenditure on health* 54.4%
6.   Private expenditure on health as % of total expenditure on health** 45.6%
7.   External resources for health as % of total expenditure on health 0.0%
8.   Out-of-pocket expenditure on health as % of total expenditure on health 36.1%
9.   Out-of-pocket expenditure on health as % of GDP 2.7%
10. Private prepaid plans on health as % of total expenditure on health 5.7%
Notes:
* This includes general tax-funded health spending and payroll tax-funded mandatory health insurance
**This includes private prepaid plans and out-of-pocket payments
Source: Data drawn from World Health Organisation’s Global Health Expenditure Database (http://apps.who.int/nha/database/Key_Indicators/Index/en)
Key health care expenditure 
indicators
This section examines overall levels of health expenditure 
in South Korea and identifies the main sources of health 
financing (Table 1).2 In 2012, total health expenditure 
accounted for 7.5% of the country’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), an amount that was substantially lower 
than the average of 12.0% for other high-income 
countries and the global average of 9.2%. 
Public allocations to fund the health sector (including 
National Health Insurance)3 were close to 14% of 
total government expenditure. This was lower than 
the average of 17% for other high-income countries 
but close to the 15% target set by the Organisation 
for African Unity’s 2001 Abuja Declaration (which, 
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coincidentally, happened to be the same as the global 
average for 2012). 
Government health expenditure translated into only 4.1% 
of GDP. This was much lower than the high-income country 
average of 7.2% for that year, and below the global 
average of 5.3%. 
Per capita health expenditure by the South Korean 
government was around $1,264 (in terms of purchasing 
power parity) in 2012. This was half the high-income country 
average of $2,737 but double the global average of $652. 
As would have been expected from the relatively low levels 
of government expenditure for its income category, out-of-
pocket payments played a significant role in South Korea, 
at just over a third (36%) of total financing in 2012. This 
was high in global terms (where the average was 21%), 
despite the achievement of universal health coverage 
as long ago as 1989. It was also above the 20% limit 
suggested by the 2010 World Health Report to ensure that 
financial catastrophe and impoverishment as a result of 
accessing health care become negligible (World Health 
Organisation 2010).
Finally, in 2012, private health insurance in South Korea 
played a small role at only 6% of total health sector 
financing.  All in all, private expenditure – which includes 
out-of-pocket payments and voluntary prepaid plans – 
accounted for almost one half (46%) of health financing.
Structure of the health system 
according to health financing 
functions
Figure 1 provides a summary of the structure of the South 
Korean health system, depicted according to the health 
care financing functions of revenue collection, pooling and 
purchasing, as well as health service provision.  Each block 
represents the percentage share of overall health care 
expenditure accounted for by each category of revenue 
source, pooling organisation, purchasing organisation 
and health care provider.4 
Revenue collection
South Korea achieved universal health coverage in 
1989, just 12 years after mandatory health insurance 
was first introduced to employees of large companies. 
This was achieved relatively cheaply. In 2012, the 
contribution rate for the mandatory National Health 
Insurance (NHI) scheme was only 5.89% of formal 
sector employees’ salaries: half of this was paid by 
employers. There is a ceiling on the amount employees 
have to pay under this system.
NHI contributions from the informal sector are calculated 
on the basis of the capacity to pay, which is assessed using 
information such as income and property ownership. 
4 The data quoted in this section are slightly different from the previous section because they are based on more detailed disaggregation by the author of National Health 
Accounts data for 2010, derived from the Korean Statistical Information Service (http://kosis.kr/statisticsList/statisticsList_01List.jsp?vwcd=MT_ZTITLE&parentId=D)
Figure 1: A function summary chart for South Korea (2010)
Notes: The category ‘other’ in the revenue collection row includes contributions from private non-profit organisations and private companies
Source: Created by the author using data from the Korean Statistical Information Service
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Another source of revenue for NHI is a government subsidy 
for the self-employed. The government subsidy consists of 
two different sources: general taxes and an earmarked 
amount of tobacco tax. For example, in 2010, about 
54% of the tobacco tax earmarked for the health sector 
accounted for 3.2% of the NHI fund (Kim and Yeo 2014). 
Finally, low-income people who cannot afford to join 
NHI are covered by the Medical Aid Programme, which is 
funded by general taxes.    
Subscription to private health insurance is voluntary 
although members still have to contribute to NHI. People 
purchase private health insurance to gain access to benefits 
that are not provided by the NHI package, as well as to 
cover co-payments. Although the share of private prepaid 
health insurance was only 6% of total funding in 2012, 
about 80% of the population had private insurance (Seo 
et al. 2014). 
Beneficiaries of the Medical Aid Programme pay no, or 
discounted, user fees. Those beneficiaries of NHI who are 
elderly or have severe diseases (such as cancer) also pay 
low co-payments. Other beneficiaries of NHI pay the usual 
co-payments. 
The facts that one third of health financing is derived from 
these out-of-pocket payments, and that the coverage of 
commercial insurance is high, point to the problem in 
the South Korean health system of inadequate financial 
risk protection.
Pooling
There are two financing pools in South Korea, one for 
NHI and the other for the Medical Aid Programme. These 
are effectively combined for the purpose of purchasing 
services, which enhances income cross-subsidies.
Private health insurance is made up of fragmented risk 
pools. Out-of-pocket payments, which make up a third of 
total financing, are not pooled at all. 
Purchasing
Everyone in South Korea is entitled to the same range of 
service benefits, whether they belong to NHI or the Medical 
Aid Programme. Services that are not included in the benefit 
package are paid for on an out-of-pocket basis by those 
who can afford them. As mentioned earlier, some people 
purchase complementary insurance to get reimbursement 
for these uncovered services. 
There is an explicit purchaser-provider split in South Korea. 
Both the National Health Insurance Service and the Health 
Insurance Review and Assessment Service are quasi-public 
agencies that are responsible for overseeing the purchasing 
of services under the supervision of the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare. 
The National Health Insurance Service collects and pools 
contributions for NHI and receives funds for the Medical 
Aid Programme separately. Although there are two separate 
pools, purchasing decisions apply to them equally. In this 
sense, the National Health Insurance Service is a single 
purchaser. It meets each group of providers (such as 
hospitals, clinics and dentists) annually for fee negotiations 
and uses its market power to control cost increases to 
some extent.
The Health Insurance Review and Assessment Service 
routinely reviews provider performance, not only for 
payment of claims but also for quality assurance. It 
penalizes poor performance and incentivises good 
performance by publishing information on provider 
behaviour. For example, South Korea is well known for its 
high Caesarean section and antibiotic prescription rates. 
These rates for individual providers are disclosed every 
year so that patients can make an informed choice. The 
Health Insurance Review and Assessment Service provides 
incentives for those providers that reduce expenditure on 
prescribed medicines. Depending on the extent of providers’ 
contributions to the reduction of expenditure, 10% to 50% 
of the reduced amount is paid to the individual provider.
The main method of paying providers is fee-for-service, 
which encourages them to increase the intensity of 
services. From July 2013, case payment methods, such 
as Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs), were introduced to 
pay for inpatient services for seven diseases (e.g. cataract 
surgery, appendectomy, Caesarean section etc.) across all 
types of providers. Prior to that date, providers had signed 
up for DRG-based reimbursement only on a voluntary basis, 
which meant that only clinics that anticipated economic 
gains chose to participate. From July 2013, however, the 
South Korean government made participation in DRG 
payment mandatory to increase efficiency in the utilization 
of inpatient services, at the same time as maintaining 
service quality.
There is no explicit rationing mechanism to limit the 
utilisation of services. As there is no gate-keeping at the 
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primary health care level, patients have no limits on their 
access to higher levels of care. For example, patients with flu 
can directly visit outpatient departments at tertiary hospitals 
as long as they are willing to pay higher co-payments. In 
addition, providers tend to actively introduce uncovered 
services, which are usually very expensive because there 
are no fee controls. 
These problems lead to an inefficient allocation of resources 
and the persistent expansion of uncovered services, 
making it difficult for the National Health Insurance Service 
to improve the financial protection offered by the system.
Provision
There is no difference in the service providers to which 
patients have access under NHI and the Medical Aid 
Programme.
Health services are predominantly provided by the private 
sector, although health financing depends mainly on public 
sources such as mandatory health insurance and general 
tax, as already described. About 90% of hospital beds 
belong to private hospitals (Ministry of Health and Welfare 
2013). Some services are provided by public providers, 
but it is difficult to estimate the relative utilisation of public 
and private providers. 
In terms of utilisation by type of service, in 2010 outpatient 
and inpatient utilisation made up equal shares (35%), 
followed by medicines (25%), according to the Korean 
Statistical Information Service. 
In terms of levels of care, 42% of health expenditure was on 
hospitals while 27% was on clinics in 2010. Recently, South 
Korea has experienced a rapid increase in hospital beds 
due to the emergence of big, enterprise-type hospitals. 
Considering that most health needs can be met at the 
primary care level, too many health resources are consumed 
at the secondary and tertiary levels in South Korea.
Financial protection and equity 
in financing
A key objective of universal health coverage is to provide 
financial protection for everyone in the country.  Insights 
into the existing extent of financial protection are provided 
through indicators such as the extent of catastrophic 
payments and the level of impoverishment due to paying 
for health services. This section analyses these indicators 
for South Korea and then moves on to assess the overall 
equity of the health financing system.
Catastrophic payment indicators
Using the 40% threshold of non-food household 
expenditure for assessing catastrophic payments, Table 
2 shows that less than 2% of the population incurred 
catastrophic spending in South Korea in 2000 as a 
result of accessing health care. However, it is agreed in 
the international literature that this method is difficult to 
interpret as it can understate the actual problem. This is 
because it may not capture the reality that there are people 
who do not utilise health services when needed because 
they are unable to afford out-of-pocket payments at all 
(Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003). 
A slightly lower weighted headcount indicates that high-
income households experienced catastrophic payment 
more frequently than low-income households. The 
catastrophic payment gap index shows that the average 
amount by which out-of-pocket payments as a percentage 
Table 2: Catastrophic payment indicators for South Korea (2000)*
Catastrophic payment headcount index
(the percentage of households whose out-of-pocket payments for health care as a percentage of household 
consumption expenditure exceeded the threshold)
1.9%
Weighted headcount index** 1.7%
Catastrophic payment gap index
(the average amount by which out-of-pocket health care payments as a percentage of household consumption 
expenditure exceed the threshold)
0.3%
Weighted catastrophic gap index** 0.2%
Notes:
* Financial catastrophe is defined as household out-of-pocket spending on health care in excess of the threshold of 40% of non-food household expenditure.
** The weighted headcount and gap indicate whether it is the rich or poor households who mostly bear the burden of catastrophic payments. If the weighted index exceeds 
the un-weighted index, the burden of catastrophic payments falls more on poorer households.
Source: van Doorslaer et al. (2007)
7Universal Health Coverage Assessment: South Korea
of household expenditure exceeded the threshold 
was 0.27%, and that the gap was concentrated on the 
rich rather than the poor. These results may reflect that 
richer patients utilised expensive, uncovered services on 
a voluntary basis while poorer patients were not able to 
afford those services.
It should be borne in mind, however, that these estimates 
are based on data that are fifteen years old.
Impoverishment indicators
While the extent of catastrophic payments indicates the 
relative impact of out-of-pocket payments on household 
welfare, the absolute impact is shown by the impoverishment 
effect. Taking account of the economic status of South 
Korea, it is not appropriate to use international poverty 
lines in calculating impoverishment. Instead, South Korea’s 
national poverty line, defined as minimum living costs, 
was used to measure the impoverishing impact of out-of-
pocket payments.
In South Korea, about 11% of the population lived below 
the national poverty line per day in 2000 (see Table 3). An 
extra 2% dropped into poverty as a result of paying out-of-
pocket when accessing health services. This translated into 
as much as 800,000 people per year falling into poverty 
because of out-of-pocket expenditure on health care. 
The normalised poverty gap (also shown in Table 3) 
measures the percentage of the poverty line necessary to 
raise an individual who is below the poverty line to that 
line. The difference between the prepayment and the post-
payment poverty gaps was relatively low at 0.5% in 2000. 
This proportion might have been low partly due to the 
fact that the methodology only captures those who access 
health care services: it may have excluded those already 
very poor individuals who forgo health care services 
because they cannot afford high out-of-pocket payments.
Table 3: Impoverishment indicators for South Korea (using the national poverty line of $14 per day (in 
terms of 2000 purchasing power parity)) (2000)
Pre-payment poverty headcount 10.8%
Post-payment poverty headcount 12.5%
Percentage point change in poverty headcount (pre- to post-payment) 1.7%
Pre-payment normalised poverty gap 2.3%
Post-payment normalised poverty gap 2.8%
Percentage point change in poverty gap (pre- to post-payment) 0.5%
Source: Lee et al. (2003)
Again, it should be borne in mind that these estimates are 
based on data that are fifteen years old.
Equity in financing
Equity in financing is strongly related to financial protection 
(as described by the indicators above) but is a distinct issue 
and health system goal. It is generally accepted that financing 
of health care should be according to the ability to pay. 
A ‘progressive’ health financing mechanism is one in 
which the amount richer households pay for health care 
represents a larger proportion of their income. Progressivity 
is measured by the Kakwani index: a positive value for 
the index means that the mechanism is progressive; a 
negative value means that poorer households pay a 
larger proportion of their income and that the financing 
mechanism is therefore regressive. Table 4 provides an 
overview of the distribution of the burden of financing 
the South Korean health system across different socio-
economic groups (i.e. the financing incidence) as well as 
the Kakwani index for each financing mechanism. 
As expected, in 2000 direct tax was progressive while 
indirect tax was slightly progressive or proportional. Since 
the share of direct tax was slightly larger than that of 
indirect tax, overall tax revenue was slightly progressive. 
Mandatory health insurance, which comprised 34% of total 
health financing, was regressive, implying that the poor 
bear a larger financial burden compared to their ability 
to pay. Poor households are seldom totally exempt from 
financial contributions in the South Korean NHI system, 
which explains its regressivity.
Out-of-pocket payments, the largest financing source, were 
progressive in 2000. This is because many expensive health 
services are excluded from the benefit package and paid 
for by high-income households on an out-of-pocket basis. 
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Overall, total health financing was slightly regressive 
in South Korea in 2000. Further research is required to 
understand how the situation may have changed over the 
intervening 15 years.
Equitable use of health services 
and access to needed care
This section considers how benefits from using different 
types of health services are distributed across socio-
economic groups. One measure of this is a concentration 
index, which shows the magnitude of socioeconomic-
related inequality in the distribution of a variable. In Table 
5, if the concentration index has a positive (or negative) 
value, the distribution of the use of the health service is 
considered to benefit the richest (or poorest) respectively.
Table 5 shows that, regardless of the type of health facility 
or service, utilisation was pro-poor. It was more pro-poor 
in hospitals than in non-hospitals, reflecting that the poor 
Table 4: Incidence of different domestic financing mechanisms in South Korea (2000)
Financing mechanism Percentage share Kakwani index
General government revenues 16.2% 0.16
Direct taxes 8.3% 0.27
Indirect taxes 7.9% 0.04
Mandatory health insurance contributions 33.9% -0.16
Total public financing sources 50.1% -
Commercial voluntary health insurance - -
Out-of-pocket payments 49.9% 0.01
Total private financing sources 49.9% -
TOTAL FINANCING SOURCES 100.0% -0.02
Note: Estimates are based on per adult equivalent expenditures;  - = data not available.
Source: O’Donnell et al. (2008) 
Table 5: Concentration indexes for benefit incidence of health service use in South Korea (2005)
Type of Service Outpatient visits Inpatient visits
Public facilities
Hospital -0.2385 -0.2225
Non-hospital - -
Private for-profit facilities
Hospitals -0.1014 -0.1305
Non-hospital facilities -0.0865 -0.0560
TOTAL -0.0918 -0.1251
Note: Estimates are based on adult-equivalent adjusted per capita household expenditure; - = data not available
Source:  Author’s calculation using data from the Korea National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey of 2005 
had greater access than the rich. In addition, service 
utilisation was more pro-poor in public hospitals than in 
private hospitals, reflecting that the poor might have been 
inclined to choose public hospitals where out-of-pocket 
payments are lower. Overall, inpatient services were more 
pro-poor than outpatient visits.
Nonetheless, there are equity issues around access to 
uncovered services, as low-income households often have 
to forgo those services.
It is generally agreed that individuals’ use of health 
services should be in line with their need for care.  The 
universal coverage goal of promoting access to needed 
health care can be interpreted as reducing the gap 
between the need for care and actual use of services, 
particularly differences in use relative to need across 
socio-economic groups.  The benefit incidence results 
discussed above do not allow one to draw a categorical 
conclusion about whether the distribution is equitable or 
not: the distribution of benefits first needs to be compared 
to the distribution of need for health care. 
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Accordingly, after adjusting the need for health care 
according to the number of chronic diseases and self-
assessed health, Kim et al. (2008) found that, in 2005, 
outpatient visits and inpatient services remained pro-poor.
Conclusion
South Korea achieved universal health coverage rapidly. To 
do so, the government chose a ‘low contribution–limited 
benefit coverage’ strategy, combined with high co-payments 
at the time of service utilisation. This inevitably resulted in 
high out-of-pocket payments, which had implications for 
financial protection and access to health services.
Currently, mandatory National Health Insurance 
contributions, the largest source of health financing, are 
regressive, mainly because of a contribution ceiling. This 
means that low-income households bear a higher financial 
burden compared to their ability to pay.
Consequently, almost 2% of households experienced 
catastrophic payments at a threshold of 40% of non-food 
household expenditure in 2000. The impoverishing impact 
of high out-of-pocket payments was a two-percentage point 
increase in poverty, affecting around 800,000 Koreans.
In addition, many expensive services are not covered under 
National Health Insurance. Low-income households have 
to pay for uncovered services on an out-of-pocket basis, 
or forgo those services. Considering that out-of-pocket 
payments are progressive, and that high-income households 
experienced catastrophic payment more frequently than low-
income households, it is likely that low-income households 
have limited access to uncovered services, whether needed 
or not, compared to their high-income counterparts.
Currently, there is much debate on how to expand benefit 
coverage in South Korea, which is crucial to improving 
the level of financial protection, increasing the size of 
the single risk pool, promoting cross-subsidisation and 
strengthening the purchasing power of government. This 
requires enhanced revenue collection and an increase 
in the share of total health expenditure made up by 
mandatory prepayment, while reducing the share of out-
of-pocket payments. 
For the expansion of benefit coverage, especially to low-
income households, it is also necessary to exert purchasing 
power more actively so as to include additional services 
that are effective in meeting the health care needs of the 
population. The National Health Insurance Service needs 
to pay attention not only to the effectiveness of services but 
also the cost-effectiveness. 
Primary care is a good example of a cost-effective set of 
services. Because the primary care level does not have 
a gate-keeping function in South Korea, many patients 
access higher levels unnecessarily and a significant 
amount of health resources are utilised inefficiently, with 
no extra health benefit. By re-vitalising the functions of 
primary care, efficiency in health service utilisation could 
be improved. 
Lastly, under the fee-for-service payment system in South 
Korea, providers have incentives to induce demand 
for more services than are necessary. Supplier-induced 
demand threatens the financial sustainability of the single 
risk pool and could result in reduced financial protection 
and access in the long run. In order for National Health 
Insurance to be sustainable, provider reimbursement 
reform – such as the introduction of an expenditure cap for 
providers through a global contract -  is urgently required 
in South Korea. 
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